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impact of licensing on hourly wages is 
much smaller than in the United States.
The major empirical findings in 
Licensing Occupations are summarized 
in Table 1. Given these results of the 
labor market impacts of licensing, 
other forms of regulation, such as 
certification, are suggested. Alternative 
forms of occupational regulation may 
provide consumers with more choice 
than licensing and reduce the potential 
monopoly impacts of licensing in the 
labor market. In order to better monitor 
the economic impacts of licensing, data 
on this form of regulation should be 
provided to academics and policymakers 
in the major national labor market data 
sources, such as the Current Population 
Survey. With more data and analysis, 
the public, workers, and policymakers 
can more accurately assess whether 
occupational licensing is ensuring quality 
or restricting competition.
Morris M. Kleiner is a professor at the 
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and the 
Industrial Relations Center at the University 
of Minnesota–Twin Cities.
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Employment and Wage 
Effects of Privatization 
Evidence from Transition Economies
The greatest opposition to 
privatizing a firm usually comes from the 
firm’s own employees, who are fearful 
of wage cuts and job losses. Workers’ 
apprehensions about privatization are 
consistent with standard economic 
analyses, whereby new private owners 
reduce the firm’s labor costs in response 
to harder budget constraints and stronger 
profit-related incentives. Discussions of 
this “efficiency effect” of privatization, 
however, implicitly assume that the 
firm’s output remains constant or at 
least does not increase. But lower costs 
may increase the firm’s market share as 
well as total quantity demanded for the 
industry, and the new private owners may 
be more entrepreneurial in marketing, 
innovation, and entering new markets. In 
such cases, the firm’s output will tend to 
rise, and if this “scale effect” dominates, 
then privatization could cause a net 
employment increase. 
The implications of privatization 
for wages are also ambiguous. New 
owners may reduce wages as part of 
a general cost-cutting policy, but if 
the firm expands, it may have to offer 
higher wages to attract new workers. 
New private owners may also be more 
likely to adopt skill-biased technologies, 
resulting in a compositional shift toward 
higher-paid workers. Depending on the 
relative strength of such factors, wages 
may either rise or fall as a result of 
privatization.
Not only does theoretical analysis 
fail to provide definitive predictions 
on the wage and employment effects 
of privatization, but also the existing 
empirical evidence is both scant and 
inconclusive, containing both negative 
and positive estimates of the effects on 
workers. Therefore, the Upjohn Institute, 
in collaboration with partners from 
Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh 
and the Central European University 
Labor Project in Budapest, has recently 
undertaken an empirical analysis of 
the effects of privatization on the wage 
bill, employment, and wage rates of 
firms in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine—countries where thousands of 
businesses were privatized in a relatively 
short period of time during the 1990s. 
These four countries had varied success 
with privatization reforms. Hungary was 
considered one of the most successful, 
Russia and Ukraine were less successful, 
and Romania was somewhere in the 
middle.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
the average real wage bill and percent 
private ownership in each country. At 
this aggregate level of analysis, a strong 
negative correlation is evident in all 
four countries, which would seem to 
corroborate workers’ fears and most 
economists’ expectations. However, 
several other events that could affect 
the wage bill occurred during the 1990s 
(including macroeconomic shocks and 
market liberalization), and the firms 
selected for privatization may have been 
declining for extraneous reasons. To 
deal with these potentially confounding 
factors and estimate the causal effects 
of privatization on workers, the project 
has analyzed microdata on firms that 
have been linked over time. The methods 
applied to estimate the privatization 
effects at the firm level draw upon some 
of those used in evaluations of labor 
market training programs in the United 
States. 
Privatization Programs and 
Implications for Workers
The methods and tempos of large 
enterprise privatization differed quite 
significantly across the four countries in 
this study. Hungary got off to an early 
start in ownership transformation and 
maintained a consistent case-by-case 
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Figure 1  Evolution of Average Real Wage Bill and Private Ownership
NOTE: The graphs show an index of the average real wage bill and percent of majority private firms on the 
vertical axis, calculated from our data. The real wage bill is set at 100 in 1989 in Hungary and 1992 for 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.
method throughout the transition. Unlike 
many other countries, there were no 
significant incentives given to workers 
to acquire shares in their companies, 
nor was there a mass distribution of 
shares aided by vouchers. Hungarian 
privatization thus resulted in very little 
worker ownership (involving only 
about 250 firms), very little dispersed 
ownership, and instead significant 
managerial ownership and highly 
concentrated block-holdings, many of 
them foreign. Although the process 
appeared at times to be slow and gradual, 
in fact it was completed earlier than in 
most other East European countries.
In Romania, by contrast, the early 
attempts to mimic voucher programs 
and sell individual firms produced few 
results, and privatization really began 
only in late 1993, first with the program 
of Management and Employee Buyouts, 
and then with the mass privatization of 
1995–1996. The consequences of these 
programs were large-scale employee 
ownership and dispersed shareholding 
by the general population, with little 
foreign involvement. Beginning in 1997, 
foreign investors became more involved, 
and blocks of shares were sold to both 
foreigners and domestic entities. The 
result was a mixture of several types 
of ownership and a moderate speed 
compared to Hungary.
Russia’s and Ukraine’s earliest 
privatization experiences have some 
similarities to the “spontaneous” period in 
Hungary, as the central planning system 
dissolved in the late 1980s and decision-
making power devolved to managers 
and work collectives. In both countries, 
the initial consequence was large-scale 
ownership by managers and workers and 
some block-holding by domestic entities. 
Subsequently, privatization through sales 
became more common, secondary trading 
increased concentration, and foreigners 
made partial inroads.
These differences in privatization 
policy design could affect the impact of 
privatization on employment and wage 
outcomes through different impacts 
on the efficiency and scale effects of 
privatization. Worker-owners are likely 
to oppose labor-saving restructuring, for 
example, and they are unlikely to have 
incentives or resources to expand output. 
Outside block-holders, on the other hand, 
should favor cost-saving restructuring, 
particularly foreign investors with access 
to management skills, new technologies, 
and financing; they also are more likely 
to respond to opportunities for expansion. 
Outsiders with small shareholdings 
may also benefit from efficiency 
improvements and scale expansion, but 
they are unlikely to influence the firm’s 
behavior. Therefore, both the efficiency 
and scale effects of privatization are 
likely to be smallest for domestic 
owners in countries where insider and 
mass privatization predominated, larger 
in cases where domestic outsiders 
acquired blocks of shares, and largest 
for privatization to foreign investors. 
Because these mechanisms are offsetting, 
however, the relative magnitudes of the 
effects of different types of privatization 
on workers are ambiguous.
Estimated Effects of Privatization
A first finding from detailed analyses 
of the firm-level data in this project is 
that, even before privatization, there are 
significant differences between firms 
that are privatized later and those that 
remain state-owned. Across the four 
countries in the analysis, the direction of 
the differences of firms later privatized to 
domestic investors is sometimes positive 
and sometimes negative. But the foreign 
differences are quite consistent, as firms 
that will be foreign-owned have higher 
wage bills, employment levels, and 
average wages than either pre-domestic 
firms or firms that always remain state-
owned in all four countries. Moreover, 
not only the levels but the growth rates 
of these outcome variables display large 
preprivatization differences. These results 
imply that there may be some selection 
biases in the privatization process, 
and that simple comparisons across 
ownership types may be misleading. The 
empirical estimates of the privatization 
effects in this project therefore control 
for any fixed differences among firms 
and differing trend growth rates that may 
affect the probability of privatization, and 
whether the new owners are domestic or 
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Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
No trends
  Domestic –0.030 0.187** –0.007 0.017
(0.035) (0.026) (0.006) (0.009)
  Foreign 0.428** 0.285** 0.152** 0.135
(0.073) (0.086) (0.043) (0.077)
With trends
  Domestic 0.002 –0.030 0.005 –0.006
(0.024) (0.017) (0.004) (0.008)
  Foreign 0.154** 0.000 0.043 0.030
(0.050) (0.068) (0.041) (0.070)
NOTE: Foreign = 1 if the majority of the firm’s shares are owned by foreigners in year t – 1. 
Domestic = 1 if the firm was private in year t – 1 but not majority-owned by foreigners. “No 
trends” specification includes firm fixed effects and industry-year interactions; “with trends” 
adds individual firm trends. Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in 
parentheses. * = significant at the 5% level. ** = significant at the 1% level.
Table 1  Employment Effects of Privatization
Table 2  Wage Effects of Privatization 
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
No trends
  Domestic –0.027 –0.023 –0.047** 0.003
(0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
  Foreign 0.307** 0.235** 0.244** 0.304**
(0.033) (0.054) (0.064) (0.095)
With trends
  Domestic –0.045** 0.006 –0.032** –0.004
(0.016) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
  Foreign 0.066* 0.116* 0.019 0.079
(0.033) (0.057) (0.063) (0.097)
NOTE: Foreign = 1 if the majority of the firm’s shares are owned by foreigners in year t – 1. 
Domestic = 1 if the firm was private in year t – 1 but not majority-owned by foreigners. “No 
trends” specification includes firm fixed effects and industry-year interactions; “with trends” 
adds individual firm trends. Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in 
parentheses. * = significant at the 5% level. ** = significant at the 1% level.
foreign investors. We compare alternative 
estimators using several specification 
tests, including variants of the “pre-
program” test, which measures selection 
bias of an estimator as the difference in 
the dependent variable prior to treatment 
between the treated and comparison 
groups. In the privatization context, 
this test must be evaluated before the 
privatization year to avoid possible 
contamination through anticipatory 
effects.
The results from these estimations 
imply that, on average, privatization has 
had little effect on the wage bill. If the 
wage bill represents a summary indicator 
of worker welfare, the firm-level analysis 
in this project does not support the 
common belief that privatization hurt 
workers. When new domestic owners are 
distinguished from foreign investors, the 
results for the former tend to be similar 
to the overall private results, as domestic 
owners dominate in most privatized 
companies. The results also provide no 
support for the widespread fear of foreign 
owners; on the contrary, they provide 
strong evidence that foreign owners 
increased the wage bill in the two Central 
and East European countries in our study, 
and in the two formerly Soviet republics 
the effect seems to be zero in the most 
pessimistic case. 
These results for the wage bill can be 
decomposed into component parts, as 
shown in Table 1 for employment and 
in Table 2 for wages. The tables show 
two alternative specifications that differ 
only on whether firm-specific trends 
are controlled for in the estimation 
procedure; in both cases firm fixed effects 
are included. The effects of domestic 
privatization on either employment or 
wages differ very little across the two 
specifications, in no case showing large 
negative effects. The largest in magnitude 
are the implied 3–5 percent reduction in 
wages in domestically privatized firms in 
Hungary and Russia.
The estimated effects of foreign 
privatization are positive for both 
employment and wages in both 
specifications in every country. The 
inclusion of firm-specific trends does 
make a substantial difference to the 
magnitude and statistical significance 
of the results, with substantial and 
significant impacts remaining for 
employment in Hungary and for wages 
in Hungary and Romania. Specification 
tests are somewhat inconclusive about 
whether it is best to include the firm-
specific trends on statistical grounds, 
so the results are somewhat ambiguous 
as to whether the benefits of foreign 
privatization for employment and 
wages are uniformly strongly positive 
or sometimes merely weakly positive. 
In all cases, however, the data reject the 
proposition that the effects are strongly 
negative.
Efficiency and Scale Effects
The results from this research 
suggest—contrary to the expectations 
of many workers, policymakers, and 
economists—that average wages and 
employment have not been substantially 
reduced by either domestic or foreign 
privatization. As discussed earlier, 
however, privatization may affect firm 
scale and efficiency in ways that produce 
opposing effects on workers. The lack of 
negative consequences could result from 
new private owners failing to improve 
efficiency, or it could result from scale 
6
Employment Research JANUARY 2006
effects that offset the efficiency effects 
of private ownership. To explore these 
possibilities, it is useful to decompose the 
estimated impact of privatization on the 
wage bill into unit labor cost reduction 
(efficiency) and output expansion (scale) 
effects.1
The results of this decomposition 
show a striking regularity: foreign 
owners have been much more active in 
both dimensions than domestic owners. 
Although smaller, the scale effect is 
positive in each country for domestic 
privatization with the exception of 
Russia, where it is negative but small and 
statistically insignificant. The efficiency 
effect measured as unit labor cost 
reduction is positive for all countries and 
both ownership forms, although again 
it is larger under foreign ownership. 
This regularity holds for the scale effect 
measured as the effect of privatization 
on output and for the efficiency effect 
measured as unit labor cost reduction 
within each country. The scale effect is 
not only positive and significant in each 
country for foreign privatization, but 
also for domestic privatization with the 
exception of Russia, where it is negative 
but small and statistically insignificant. 
The efficiency effect measured as unit 
labor cost reduction is positive for all 
countries and both ownership forms, 
although again it is larger under foreign 
ownership.
The effects vary widely across 
countries: while the foreign effects are 
similar for Hungary, Romania, and 
Ukraine, they are substantially smaller 
in Russia. But the domestic pattern 
is still more pronounced, as Hungary 
and Romania show sizable scale and 
efficiency effects of domestic ownership, 
while both effects are negligible in Russia 
and Ukraine. Thus, the cross-country 
domestic wage bill patterns (small 
and negative everywhere) mask large 
differences in scale and efficiency effects.
Conclusion
Although economic analyses of the 
effects of privatization have focused 
almost entirely on firm performance, the 
greatest political and social controversies 
have usually concerned the consequences 
for the firm’s employees. In most cases, 
it has been assumed that the employment 
and wage effects would be negative, 
and workers all around the world have 
reacted to the prospect of privatization, 
especially that to foreigners, with protests 
and strikes. Yet there have been very few 
systematic studies of the relationship 
between privatization and outcomes 
for the firm’s workers, and previous 
research has been hampered by small 
sample sizes, short time series, and little 
ability to control for selection bias. It 
has therefore remained unclear whether 
workers’ fears of privatization are in fact 
warranted.
The new research in this project, 
however, finds no evidence of large 
systematic negative consequences of 
privatization for employment and wages. 
In two of the four countries studied, small 
negative effects on wages are estimated 
for domestic privatization, but they are 
indeed quite small (minus 3–5 percent). 
By contrast, privatization to foreign 
investors produces consistently positive 
effects on the wage bill, employment, and 
wages in all four countries, regardless 
of estimation technique. The precise 
magnitudes vary with the econometric 
specification, but even in the most 
demanding specification for the data, 
the foreign results are positive and 
sometimes they are large and statistically 
significant.
The project also investigates the 
two alternative mechanisms through 
which privatization may affect outcomes 
for workers: efficiency and scale. 
The negligible effects of domestic 
privatization imply that these effects 
are largely offsetting. In Hungary and 
Romania, however, the offsetting scale 
and efficiency effects have both been 
large, while in Russia and Ukraine they 
have been small. Foreign privatization 
has resulted in much larger efficiency 
effects in all four countries, but still 
much larger scale effects, resulting in 
the increased employment and wages in 
foreign-owned firms that we observe after 
privatization.
An important caveat is that 
privatization may affect other aspects of 
worker welfare, including employment 
turnover, fringe benefits, and other work 
conditions. The data used in the project 
do not follow workers who are displaced, 
nor do they provide information on the 
alternative jobs for workers who are 
hired. The project therefore does not 
carry out a complete welfare evaluation 
of privatization, but it does provide new 
information on the effects on the wage 
bill, employment, and average wages at 
privatized firms, effects that would be 
important elements in such an evaluation.
Subject to this caveat, the results of the 
project imply that efficiency-enhancing 
owners may be good for workers, at 
least in terms of average employment 
and wage levels. Greater efficiency 
helps firms expand sales, reducing the 
likelihood of severe distress and raising 
labor demand. Workers’ employment and 
wage prospects are never systematically 
diminished by privatization, and in 
some cases—particularly with foreign 
ownership—they actually brighten.
Notes
This article is based on Upjohn Institute 
Working Paper No. 05-125, “Does 
Privatization Hurt Workers? Lessons from 
Comprehensive Manufacturing Firm Panel 
Data in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine,” by J. David Brown, John S. Earle, 
and Almos Telegdy.
1.  The wage bill is by definition unit 
labor cost times output, and therefore the 
proportional effect of privatization on the 
wage bill equals the proportional effect on 
unit labor cost plus the proportional effect on 
output.
John S. Earle is a senior economist at 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research and a professor of economics at 
Central European University.
